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FREAK-TENT OF CONTRACTS"
By D. E. PATERSON, JR.
I. "The Classical Classroom Pure Unilateral"
A says to B, "I will give you $5 if you will climb to the top of that
flagpole." B shinnies up, but before he can reach the top A calls out, "I revoke
my offer!" The question put to the class is, "What are B's rights?" When the
students hear that the proper answer is "None," they are not convinced.
The reasoning is logical: "As the performance of the consideration is what
converts an offer into a binding promise, it follows that the promise is made
in legal intendment at the moment when the performance of the consideration
is completed. It also follows that up to that moment the offer may either be
revoked, or be destroyed by the death of the offeror, and the offeree thus be
deprived of any compensation for what he has done." 2
The students, still unconvinced, probably will agree with Sir Frederick
Pollock, ". . . whatever (the) logic may be, the law really cannot be so
absurd as that; and . . . any rational court before whom such a question is
moved will surely find a way. . . ."' The courts have found ways: "In most

of the few cases where the question has arisen, the offeror has been held
bound, but it is not clear upon what theory." 4
Before inquiring into "what theories" have been proposed, the Langdellian view should be more carefully analyzed.
First, the strict theory does have the virtues of logic and simplicity,5 but
not that of substantial justice, which Professor Langdell admitted.6
Second, it has authority to support it in the general rules that an offer
is revocable at any time before acceptance and that an acceptance must always
meet the terms of the offer, i.e., acceptance must be unequivocal. There is
also authority in two classes of cases involving unilateral contracts, rewards
and brokers' cases. In both classes the offer has been held revocable before
complete performance of the act requested' (but it should be noted that the
offer in these situations is made to more than one person, and that the nature
"'The hypothesis of this paper is that unilaterals, at large, for purposes of studying formation,
are not usefully conceived as one of two coordinate bodies of contracts cases; that the classical
classroom pure unilateral, in particular, is not an important type on which an innocent law student's
teeth should be cut to the eternal nisshaping of his view of contract, hut belongs in the freak-tent
as an interesting and often instructive curiosity." Professor K. N. Llewellyn, 48 Yale L.J. 1, 36.

(1938).
'Langdell: Summary of Law of Contracts (1880), sec. 4.
'28 L.Q.R. 100 (1911).
'Williston, Contracts (1920), see. 66a.
'Wormser: The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 Yale LJ. 136 (1916).
'Op. cit., see. 4.
'Rewards: See Shuey v. United States (1875), 92 U.S. 73, 23 LEd. 697. Brokers: See Des

Rivieres v. Sullivan (1924), 247 Mass. 443, 142 N.E. 111.
( 141)
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of the transactions are such that the offerees should know that someone else
[including the offeror] might perform the requested act first). Where a
broker is given an "exclusive" agency or the agency is created for a definite
time, the offeror is generally held bound.8
Third, Professor Langdell's defense against any theory that would
deprive the offeror of his right to revoke should be noted. "Such a view,
however, would be fanciful and unsound. It does not follow that an offer
becomes a promise because it is accepted; it may be, and it frequently is,
conditional, and then it does not become a promise until the conditions are
satisfied; and in case of offers for a consideration, the performance of the
consideration is always deemed a condition. A promise must have a consideration when it is made or it can never have one. Besides, the view in
question would not even serve the purpose of substantial justice, as it would
protect the offeree, while leaving the offeror wholly unprotected." 9 It can be
seen that Professor Langdell saw a necessity for an equality of rights and
duties and thought that any theory that held one party bound and left the
other free to perform or not at his pleasure was unfair as well as illogical.
But this defense has been battered by Professor Corbin,"0 who pointed out
that the offeror invited the offeree to take a risk, i.e., full performance before
payment. "It appears that it is fair enough for the one who bears the risk
to possess the privilege (to withdraw), while the other, bearing no risk, is
deprived of both privilege and power."
To summarize, it is seen that the authority for the strict view is based
mainly upon general contract rules, that the result is unjust is admitted by
nearly all the writers," and that the logic of Langdell is largely neutralized
by that of Professor Corbin.
Admitting then that the offeror should be held bound where the offeree
has partially performed the act requested, the question is how?

II. Avoiding the Problem of the UnilateralContract
A. CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT AS BILATERAL
Professor Langdell sidestepped the question of injustice to the offeree
by advising that everyone make bilateral contracts, 2 thus closing the barn
door after the horse had departed.
The idea behind his suggestion, that bilateral contracts do not give rise
8

Williston (1936 ed.), sec. 60a, notes 1, 2.
9Op. cit., sec. 4.
"Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917), 26 Yale L.J. 169,
194-196.
"Possible exception is Professor Wormser, see footnote 5.

"Op. cit., sec. 4.
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to such troubles, has been at least partly responsible for the creation of section
31 in the Restatement of Contracts, entitled, "Presumption that offer invites
a bilateral contract." The presumption has been approved by Williston,"3
and adopted in California in Davis v. Jacoby, 4 in which case the offeror died
before the offerees entered on actual performance of his offer, but after they
had accepted by a letter. The court said that between the two extremes of clearcut unilateral and bilateral contracts "is a vague field where the particular
contract may be unilateral or bilateral depending upon the intent of the offer
(sic) and the facts and circumstances of each case" and found section 31
well suited to clarify the vagueness.
The presumption has been criticized on two counts.' 5 First, "there is
certainly scant authority for this,"'" and second, "It would appear to be much
better to presume that it (the offer) was indifferently for either a bilateral or
unilateral contract. Then either form of acceptance, a promise or an act,
would suffice. This solution permits people to make contracts as they will."
B. Los ANGELES TRACTION Co. V. WILSHIRE"
This case was one of the first to stand as authority for the thesis that the
offeror of a unilateral contract cannot revoke after the offeree has partially
performed. It has been criticized harshly.'" The court said, "When the
respondent purchased and paid upwards of $1,500 for a franchise, it had
acted upon the contract; and it would be manifestly unjust thereafter to
permit the offer that had been made to be withdrawn. The promised consideration had been partly performed, and the contract had taken on a
bilateral character. . . " The critics, finding little complaint with the result
of the decision, wondered how the offer became a contract, and if a contract,
how it became bilateral, and if bilateral how the offeree could be bound,
having given no promise. Professor Ashley suggested that the "court had in
mind some idea of estoppel,"' 9 but the California court has not explained
itself further. In the opinion of Ruess v. Baron,20 the court cited the L. A.
"Contracts (1936 ed.), sec. 60.
"1 Cal.2d 370, 34 Pac.2d 1026 (1934).

Also adopted in Massachusetts: Bridges Wilson Corp.

v. University Contracting Co. (1943), 314 Mass. 257, 49 N.E.2d 896.
"5Whittier: The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 Cal.L.R. 441, 453. Criticism
approved by Llewellyn (1939), 48 Yale LJ. 779, 809.

%'Thereis some authority. "There is the strongest reason for interpreting a business agreement
in the sense which will give it a legal support, and such agreements have been so interpreted. '
Holmes, J., in Martin v. Meles (1901), 179 Mass. 114, 117, 60 N.E. 397; see, also, Cardozo's decision
in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon (1917), 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214.
"'135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902).

'""Astounding doctrine," Wormser; see footnote 5; "its notion was very vague... a remarkable
instance of confusion of thought," Ashley; Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter-

promise, 23 Harv.L.R. 159; "obviously not logical," Trilling, comment, 10 Corn.L.Q. 220.
"9Op. cit., footnote 18.
"Cal. Dist. Ct. of App., 10 Pac.2d 518 (1932).
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Traction Co. case without comment and truly remarked that the question of
revocability of offers for unilateral contracts "has not so much troubled the
courts as the law writers and commentators."
III. Solutions to the Problem

A.

QuASI CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY

(Contract implied in law)

Recovery in quasi contract for the unjust enrichment of the offeror was
the only remedy Professor Langdell would admit existed for the aid of the
offeree. 2" The fact that the remedy was limited to cases where the offeror
was benefited was merely unfortunate. More recently it has been recognized
that the benefit to the offeror may be far less than the detriment to the offeree
and the latter would be little better off than if no such remedy existed.2 2
For example, where A offers to give a farm to B in return for B's moving to
the farm and caring for A for the rest of his life: If B sells his present home
and moves many miles to A's farm to perform the requested acts and after
a few weeks A revokes the offer, A's benefit is the services received for a few
weeks, but B's loss is the breaking up of his home and moving as well as the
time spent caring for A.2" In the "classroom" example of the flagpole it is
even clearer that the offeror has not been benefited by the offeree's partial
performance and that the offeree would have no remedy in quasi contract.
Professor Page,24 viewing the inadequacy of the remedy, said, "The result
seems to most persons immoral and unethical."
B. QUASI CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY (Contract implied-in-fact)
It has also been suggested that the courts should enforce an impliedin-fact contract after there has been a revocation to compensate the offeree
for what he has done for the offeror at the latter's request.2" The suggestion
has been criticized on the ground that no promise can be implied in view of
the expressed intent of the offeror.2 6 This writer has found no cases supporting the theory.
C. SECTION 45 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
In an article2" in 1914 Professor D. 0. McGovney

made a careful
analysis of the problem of unilateral contracts and found that it was the
"Langdell, op. cit., s. 4, Williston (1920 ed.), sec. 60a.
2
" McGovney, 27 Harv.L.R. 644.
-'For a case holding A bound by a contract, see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin (1917), 116 Me. 399,
102 Atl. 106. For comment that B would not be adequately compensated by recovery in quasi
contract, see Corbin; The Formation of a Unilateral Contract (1918), 27 Yale L.J. 382, 383.
"45 Page, Contracts, 2d ed. (1920), sec. 130.
2 Costigan: Implied-in-Fact Contracts (1920), 33 Harv.L.R. 376, footnote 35, page 399.
6
Ashley: (1910) 23 Harv.L.R. 159, 162.
"Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv.L.R. 644.
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ordinary understanding of the offeree who commenced performance that the
offeror would allow him the stated time, or if not stated, a reasonable time to
complete the act requested. He concluded that the principal offer contains
an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke, which becomes binding once
the offeree has entered upon performance. This theory has been criticized
by Professor Corbin28 on the grounds that the inference may be contrary to
fact and that it creates a fiction which is not necessary nor desirable.2 9
Professor Corbin's own view was more direct: the offer becomes irrevocable when the offeree begins performance of the requested acts, unless the
offeror expressly reserved the power of revocation.
Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts seems to be an attempt to
compromise the McGovney and Corbin views. ° It says that the effect of
partial performance is to bind the offeror to a contract, his dity to perform
being conditional upon complete performance by the offeree. Comment (b)
explains that the reason the offeror is bound is that partial performance is
an acceptance of the subsidiary offer suggested by Professor McGovney. It
should be noted that there is an innovation in the wording of the Restatement
theory. Where the ancestor theories went no further than to say that partial
performance rendered the offer irrevocable, the offspring says that a
"contract" comes into being. The reason for the change lies in the Restate.
ment's definition of a contract (in sec. 1) as a promise or a set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy. This definition differs from
the more ancient and accepted one of an "agreement" for breach of which
the law gives a remedy.31 Under the older definition there could be no "contract" until there was agreement which was only arrived at in the case of
unilateral contracts by complete performance of the requested act. But under
the new definition there is a contract whenever there is a binding promise,
regardless of agreement. Thus there is no difference between the two original
theories and the resultant one, except for the word "contract," the meaning
of which is the same as the older phrase "irrevocable offer." 2
Section 45 has been approved in California,"3 but was rejected in New
York."'
"26 Yale L.J. 169, 194-196 (1917). Same criticism also made by Williston (1920 ed.), sec. 60a.
"'As to the implied promise being a fiction, Professor Whittier (1929), in 17 Cal.L.R. 441, 450,
denied that it was, agreeing with the inventor that it was the natural understanding of the parties.
S°Both were advisers to the reporter, Mr. Williston.
'Black's Law Dict., Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1549, 17 C.J.S. 310-312.
"For a suggested amendment of section 45, see Willis (1932), 7 Ind.LJ. 429, 432-433.
"Ruess v. Baron, supra, footnote 20. Lyon v. Goss (1942), 19 Cal.2d 659, 672, 123 Pac.2d 11.
"Charles E. Quincey & Co. v. Cities Service Co. (1935), 156 Misc. 83, 282 N.Y.S. 294. Kovacs
v. Countess Mara, Inc. (1949), 90 N.Y.S.2d 172.

146

THE HASTINGS JOURNAL

D. ESTOPPEL
Professor Ashley suggested in an article in 1910"5 that the offeror be
prevented from revoking by an estoppel in pais, when there is no other means
of avoiding injustice to the offeree. The doctrine of estoppel was invoked
originally only in cases of misrepresentation of past or present facts, and
not in the cases of promises as to the future.8 6 Later the doctrine was extended
and used where there was a misleading in reliance upon a gratuitous
promise. 7 The Restatement has adopted Professor Ashley's suggestion in
section 90 and one "may well ask, in view of section 90, why section 45?"" 8
Both sections seem to answer the problem of unilateral contracts, but section
90 has been used by the courts almost exclusively as authority for the doctrine
of promissory estoppel where the promise under consideration did not contemplate a unilateral contract. The only case this writer has found which
used the estoppel theory to bind the offeror to a promise which contemplated
a unilateral contract was Ellis v. Wadleigh,89 where section 90 was cited in
support of the opinion, which held that the offeror could not revoke her offer
after the offeree had performed the requested acts for almost 20 years.
Thus after 37 years Professor Ashley's idea has finally found a reception
in a court, and the doctrine of estoppel has been expanded again, enlarging
the loophole in the general rule of the necessity for consideration. This
encroachment on the doctrine of consideration is justified by "compelling
reasons of justice for enforcing promises, where injustice cannot be otherwise
avoided, when they have led the promisee to incur any substantial detriment
on the faith of them, not only when the promisor intended, but also when he
should reasonably have expected such detriment would be incurred, though
he did not request it as an exchange for his promise." 4 But this language
seems to indicate that the rule of section 90 should not be applied in the
case of a promise to make a unilateral contract, and that Ellis v. Wadleigh
erroneously cited it.
Closely related to the theory of estoppel is that of "good faith" advocated by Professor Ballantine.4 1 He criticized Professor McGovney's idea of
a subsidiary promise, saying, "This theory reaches a just and desirable result,
but seems needlessly complex and artificial. It makes two contracts grow
where only one was intended. To hold the offer 'irrevocable' is the same in
"23 Harv.L.R. 159. Presumably Professor Ashley invented this application of the doctrine of
estoppel as he cited no cases.
"Williston (1936 ed.), 139.
"'Ricketts v. Scothorn (1898), 57 Nebr. 51, 77 N.W. 365, 73 Am.St.Rep. 491.
"Unilateral Contract Law, 33 Col.L.R. 464, 465, footnote 11.
:"27 Wash.2d 941, 182 Pac.2d 49, 55 (1947).
"Williston (1936 ed.), sec. 139.
"Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial Performance (1921), 5 Minn.L.R. 94.
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effect as to hold the promise binding. The law imposes the obligation precluding the offeror from arbitrarily revoking the offer, after inducing a person
to act on the faith of it, because this is demanded by good faith and common
honesty. It does not depend upon a collateral contract or a tacit promise
to hold the offer open . . . There is no unfairness . . . He is simply held
to the exercise of good faith where revocation would result in cheating one
who was rendering him services at his request." 4 It has been suggested that

the distinction between this and the estoppel theory is verbal only, to avoid
the pitfalls of the word."
E. OTHER COUNTRIES
The English view seems to be much like that of Professor Corbin, that

an "unequivocal beginning of the performance requested" is an acceptance

of the offer. 4 This has been criticized because it was not explained. 5
". .. the majority of French commentators . . . agree that there can
be no revocation for the stated time or a reasonable time." 4 This would seem

to be in accord with the American view in brokerage cases.4 7
A few countries have provided by statute that offers may become irrev-

ocable under certain circumstances.4 '

"'Citing Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co. (1912), 150 Wisc. 517, 137 N.W. 769, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1214, Anno.Cas. 1914A 793.
"4 So.CaLLR., Supp. 64, Restatement of Contracts Annotated (1931).
"Winfield: Pollock's Principles of Contract, 12th ed. (1946), p. 18. No cases cited.
"McGovney, 27 Harv.L.R. 644.
"Unilateral Contracts in Louisiana, 16 Tulane L.1. 456.
"Williston (1936 ed.), sec. 60a, footnotes 1, 2.
"'Swiss Code of Oblig., sec. 3; German Civ. Code, sees. 145, 658; Japanese Civ. Code, art. 521.
Cited in Corbin's Anson, Contracts, 5th Amer. ed. (1930), page 56, footnote 2.

